averting gaze by a participant. This shift to internal processing, in turn, facilitates and has a functional benefit for the problem solving in hand (Phelps et al., 2006) .
The theoretical framework that we propose is that visual communication cues are informative and hence carry a processing cost that can interfere with task-relevant processing resources. Our program of GA research started with the finding that young children did more poorly on tasks involving a high load on visuospatial working memory when they looked at faces concurrently (Doherty-Sneddon et al., 2000; Doherty-Sneddon et al., 2001) . Given that GA occurs in response to cognitive difficulty of a range of different types of tasks (not just those loading heavily on visuospatial working memory), including autobiographical memory questions, mental arithmetic, and verbal reasoning questions (Doherty-Sneddon & Phelps, 2005) , it is likely that other aspects of working memory are involved. The face-to-face interference effects we have found, the benefits of GA on task performance (Phelps et al., 2006) , and recent pilot work showing exceptionally high proportions of time spent averting gaze even on easy tasks for children with ADHD (Doherty-Sneddon, Phelps, & Calderwood, 2007) all support the view that GA serves to facilitate working memory function. In the current study we expand on our previous work, which has shown GA to be an external indicator of concentration and mental effort. We investigate whether particular patterns of GA can be used to judge not only mental effort, but when children are in states of transient knowledge.
Over the last two decades, one of the most important contributions to our understanding of how human mental development proceeds is Karmiloff-Smith's Representational Redescription (RR) model (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) . She proposes that much of cognitive development involves the recoding (or redescription) of what is initially implicitly held knowledge into that which is increasingly consciously appreciated (explicit) and ultimately open to verbalization. Movement from one stage to the next involves transition in knowledge structures. For example, during implicit understanding, children accomplish tasks with little conscious understanding of how they do so. Gaze Aversion 5 With development, children begin to abstract out the possible rules surrounding their success and begin to apply a theory to their achievement. In the case of language learning, Karmiloff-Smith (Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1974) proposes that children over-generalize a variety of rules e g. applying the "ed" rule in past tense forms of irregular verbs (goed instead of went; swimmed instead of swam). Pine and Messer (1999) developed this model further and through empirical observations proposed six stages of recoding of information (there were four in the original), as documented in Table 1 .
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
It could be argued that solving a problem with explicitly held knowledge is more cognitively demanding than implicit solving (via involvement of both working memory, particularly central executive resources, and long term memory rules to finding a problem's solution). Our earlier work has linked GA with high cognitive load, and we therefore investigate whether we find evidence of increased GA (associated with high cognitive load) when children evidence a move through the stages of recoding of information between implicit and explicit knowledge. In Study 1 we investigate whether children who deepen their understanding on a balance beam problem (irrespective of external task performance) use more GA than children who do not evidence a change in knowledge state.
Related to this account of transitional knowledge as a cognitively demanding time is the proposal that transitional knowledge states can be identified via unstable competence on a task. Alibali and Goldin-Meadow (1993) report that some children gain competence on a task directly, going from zero competence to complete competence; these children they refer to as "skippers." In contrast, other children (the majority) acquire competence in a more gradual, stepwise manner, going from zero competence, to an unstable level of competence to full task competence. GoldinGaze Aversion 6 Meadow, Nusbaum, Garber, and Church (1993) propose that transitional knowledge states (associated with an unstable level of competence) are especially cognitively demanding, requiring more processing resources than when children are competent or incompetent on a task. We therefore predict that when children experience intermediate states in their performance level, they will use more GA than when they are in the stable states and more overall than the immediate improvers. In Study 2 we look at whether transitional task performance is associated with high levels of GA.
There are, therefore, different accounts of what transitional knowledge is or how knowledge levels change. We predict that knowledge development is cognitively demanding, involving high levels of individual processing resources. The point of this paper is not to support or refute a particular theoretical account of how knowledge changes, but to provide evidence that when it does change, this is a cognitively demanding time. We hypothesize that while children evidence either an increase in explicitness of underlying knowledge (Study 1) or a gradual increase in task performance (Study 2), the proportion of time spent in GA will be especially high.
In Study 1, a group of 6-year-olds engaged in a learning task, the balance beam task (Pine & Messer, 2003) , to establish whether the pattern of increased GA during task improvement (found in earlier work) could be replicated. The interesting feature of this task is that it allows a differentiation between task "success" per se and task comprehension or learning. So, for example, when comprehension of the task is low, children are often able implicitly but correctly to balance symmetrical beams, but unable to explain how they did it. As comprehension progresses, performance drops initially, although their explanations and reasoning about their strategies improve. See Table 1 for definitions of stages of progress on the beam task and the stages of mental representation redescription with which these are associated (Karmiloff-Smith 1992 
Method

Participants
Participants were thirty-three 6-year-olds, 16 girls and 17 boys, with a mean age of 6 years 3 months (age range = 5 years 8 months -6 years 10 months). Children were recruited through local schools and took part only upon the acquisition of written parental permission. Eight of the children failed to complete all stages of the experiment, leaving 25 children in the final sample.
Design
A pre-test, training, and post-test design was used. The dependent variables were: the amount of pre-test to post-test improvement in ability to balance symmetric and asymmetric beams; levels of explanations given by the children of how the beams balanced or did not balance, which were coded using the 6-level coding scheme developed by Pine and Messer (2003) , ranging from implicit to explicit comprehension; and the percentage of time spent averting gaze while explaining why beams did or did not balance in the pre-test and post-test.
Procedure
Balance task. There were three symmetrical beams with the same number of blocks on either side (one with no blocks on either side, one had one block on either side, and one had two blocks on each side). These beams balanced in the geometric center. A more difficult version of the task involves asymmetric beams (Pine & Messer, 2000) . There were three asymmetrical beams in the current study with a different number of blocks on each end (one with two blocks at one end and no blocks at the other end, one with three blocks at one end and no blocks at the other end, and one with three blocks at one end and one block at the other end). All of these beams balanced off-center.
Protocol. Children were tested individually in a quiet area of the school. The child sat across from the experimenter at a table where the fulcrum and the beams were placed. A video camera was placed directly behind the experimenter so that the child's head and shoulders could be recorded Gaze Aversion 8 and gaze aversion could be coded later. The children engaged in a pre-test, a training phase, and a post-test.
The child was first informed that he or she was going to be talking about balance, and was asked if he or she could explain what balancing meant. Then the child was shown the fulcrum and told that he or she would be given some beams to try to balance on the fulcrum. The child was told to try to make each beam stay level, so that it did not tip off to one side. For the pre-test, children were asked to balance the six beams (three symmetric; three asymmetric) one by one, and after the attempt to balance each beam, were asked to explain why it did or did not balance. The experimenter gave no feedback at this stage. Any child who could balance all six beams correctly and gave full explicit explanations of how the beams balanced in terms of weight and length did not proceed any further. This was the case for only one child.
Training. After the pre-test, children completed a training phase where the experimenter modelled how to balance one of the symmetrical and one of the asymmetrical beams and encouraged the child to think about how they balanced. No specific information was provided at this stage about the compensatory function of length and weight for the asymmetrical beams or about the need to have the same amount of weight on each side of the beam so that it would balance. Children observed the experimenter balancing the beams and then were asked to talk about how they had balanced. For example after watching the experimenter balance a symmetrical beam, they were asked questions like, "How did I get that one to balance? Why did I put it in the middle?
What have we got on this side, what have we got on this side?" to try to get them to think about the same weights being on each side. After an asymmetrical beam, they were asked "How did I get that one to balance? Why doesn't it go in the middle? What have we got on this side, what have we got on this side?" The children then had another go at balancing all the beams, and then the experimenter again showed them how to balance one symmetrical and one asymmetrical beam, but this time explicitly talked about weight and length, e.g., "This one balances in the middle because Gaze Aversion 9 we have the same size of weights on each side and the same length of beam on each side." The asymmetrical beams don't balance in the middle because we have a heavier weight on this side, and if we put it in the middle it will fall down to this side, so we need to make the other side longer so that we have the same weight on each side. So, how do we get the same weight on each side? Well, what have we got on this side? (child normally responds 'blocks') and what have we got on this side? (child normally responds 'blocks'). But what else have we got on this side?" The experimenter would then point to the length of the beam and explain that this also gives weight. The experimenter explained that for symmetrical beams the lengths had to be the same on both sides, but that for asymmetrical beams, the side with fewer blocks would have to be longer so that you would have the same weight overall on each side. This modelling was done as naturally as possible with each child, although specific contributions from the experimenter came from a predetermined standardized script.
Pine and Messer (2000) found significant improvements on the post-test of the beam task when children observed an adult modelling the correct solution and were encouraged to explain how the experimenter balanced the beams. Children in this condition did better on the post-test than children who only observed the experimenter and did not discuss how the beams were balancing. Pine and Messer also report different levels of expertise associated with different forms of explanation given by children. These are defined in Table 1 .
Children then carried out the first post-test, where they were again given the six beams to balance and were again asked to explain how/why the beams did or did not balance. Testing finished here for any child who successfully balanced all six beams and gave full explicit explanations in terms of length and weight. For those with only partial success in performance and/or explanations, training was repeated and a second post-test given.
Classification of children's progress. In order to gain a clearer impression of how GA changes as children's knowledge on the balance task develops, children were divided into two groups, according to the level at which their explanations were coded at the pre-test and post-test stages. Any child who showed consistent improvement as the experiment progressed (such as being classified as implicit at the pre-test and then classified as abstraction-verbal at the first post-test and as explicit at the second post-test) was classified as an improver. Children who did not show any improvement in their explanations as the experiment progressed (e.g., continued to give implicit explanations at each stage) or who regressed (e.g., those who were classified as abstraction-verbal at the pre-test and then gave implicit explanations at the post-test) were classified as non-improvers (only one non-improver actually regressed). Table 2 gives data on criteria as well as levels of explanations given by both groups at pre-test and post-test. This shows that while the starting point on levels of explanation given by all children were similar, about two thirds of them showed rapid increases in the sophistication of their explanations, while the others remained very static.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Gaze aversion coding. Thinking time was defined as the period of time when the experimenter finished asking the question and the child began speaking a response. The GA dependant measure was the percentage of thinking time spent averting gaze. An independent coder analyzed the video records of 10% of the children randomly sampled for GA. The coders measured thinking time as well as GA time in seconds and from this ascertained the percentage of thinking time scores for each trial coded. There was a very strong correlation between the GA data point scores produced by each of the two coders, r(71) = .90, p < .001, evidencing very good agreement on the GA coding.
Results
Task Performance
The mean number of symmetric and asymmetric beams successfully balanced at the pre-test, posttest-1, and post-test-2 is displayed in Table 3 (maximum = 3 for both kinds of beam). A three-way ANOVA was carried out: task difficulty (2 levels: symmetric beam, asymmetric beam) and training stage (3 levels: pre-training; post-training-1; post-training-2) within participant variables, group (2 levels: improvers; non-improvers) was a between participant variable. The ANOVA revealed a significant effect of training on task performance, F (2,46) = 48.85, p < .001, η p 2 = .68, with better performance after training than before (mean pre-training = 1.69 correct responses; mean post- Post-hoc t-test revealed a significant group effect, with improvers better than non-improvers on the asymmetric beams, t(23) = 2.00, p < .05, but not on the symmetric beams, t(23) = .38, p > .05.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
In summary, improvers did better than non-improvers on the harder version of the task, although both groups significantly increased their performance when the experimenter modelled the correct technique.
Gaze Aversion
The proportion of time children averted their gaze while explaining why the beams did or did not balance was calculated from the videos and is presented in Table 4 for each stage of the experiment (pre-test, post-test-1 and post-test-2).
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
A three-way ANOVA was used to analyse the percentage of time children spent averting gaze during the explanations. The ANOVA included task difficulty (2 levels: symmetric beam, asymmetric beam) and training stage (3 levels: pre-training; post-training-1; post-training-2) as within participant variables. Group (2 levels: improvers; non-improvers) was a between-participant variable. Task difficulty had a significant impact on the percentage of time children spent averting their gaze, with more GA occurring as children explained asymmetric beams F(1,23) = 4.59, p <.05, η p 2 = .17 (mean GA on symmetric beams = 55.4% of explanation time; mean on asymmetric beams = 59.1%). Group also had a significant effect on GA, F(1,23) = 4.85, p < .05, η p 2 = .17 (mean GA for improvers was 64.23%; for non-improvers, 50.29%). There was a significant interaction between task difficulty and group, F(1, 23) = 5.98, p < .05, η p 2 = .21. Means are given in Table 4 .
Post-hoc t-tests showed that only the non-improvers increased GA with increasing task difficulty, t(26) = 4.06, p <.001. In addition, improvers used significantly more GA than non-improvers at both levels of task difficulty (on symmetrical beams: t(73) = 3.90, p < .001; on asymmetrical beams: t(73) = 2.59, p < .05).
Gaze Aversion
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Discussion
Study 1 replicates a finding from a number of earlier studies (e.g. Doherty-Sneddon et al., 2002; 2004; -that GA increases as task demands get harder. This was only the case for the non-improvers, however, as improvers' levels of GA were already high, even on the easier version of the task. Furthermore, although non-improvers increased their GA with increased task difficulty, their GA was still significantly lower than the improvers' GA during the harder version of the task. The current work shows that children who improve their level of task comprehension (defined by their explanations of their task solutions) use more GA than those who do not. Of course this data represents a snapshot of children's behaviour when they have just improved their task comprehension. While out of the scope of the current study, it may be that with increased expertise/practice on the task, proportion of time spent averting gaze will fall as task demands reduce. So, while explicit processing is likely to be more demanding than implicit processing because of the greater attentional resources required of it, practice and expertise will also play a role in determining absolute level of task demand.
Study 2: Time Task
Method Participants
Participants were fifty-nine 6-year-olds. Seven of the children, who either (a) answered all the questions correctly at all stages of difficulty, and so there was no training required, or (b) failed to make any progress at all after training (going from 0 correct to 0 correct) were removed from the analysis. In the remaining 52, there were 18 girls and 34 boys, mean age 6 years 5 months (age range, 5 years 9 months -7 years 1 month). Children were recruited through local schools and took part only upon the acquisition of written parental permission.
Design
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A pre-test, training, and post-test design was used. The dependent variables were the amount of pretest to post-test improvement in ability to tell the time and the percentage of time spent averting gaze while thinking of a response in the pre-test and post-test.
Procedure
Children were tested individually in a quiet area of the school. The child sat across from the experimenter at a table. A video camera was placed directly behind the experimenter so that the child's head and shoulders could be recorded and gaze aversion could be coded later. Children were first informed that they were going to be talking about time and that they would have to work out what time it was, depending on where the big and little hands of a clock were pointing. Four levels of difficulty were used-o'clock (level 1), half past (level 2), quarter past (level 3) and quarter to (level 4). The task and the different levels of difficulty were proposed by the class teachers, as telling time was a topic they were currently working on and that the children had not yet mastered.
There were three pre-test questions at each level. All children started at level 1 and were asked the 
Results
Gradual Improvers
Task performance. Accuracy of responses at pre-test, post-test-1, and post-test-2 was calculated as a percentage of correct responses. Twenty-eight of the children went from 0% accuracy on pre-test to 100% accuracy immediately on post-test-1. These children were classed as immediate improvers (in the Alibali and Goldin-Meadow (1993) terminology they would be called skippers). The remaining 23 children exhibited a much more gradual increase in task competence, requiring the additional second training session before achieving full competence at post-test-2.
These children were classed as gradual improvers. Because of the different levels of testing sessions (only two for the immediate improvers and three for the gradual improvers), the data for the two groups of children are analyzed separately.
A one-way ANOVA with repeated measures on session (3 levels: pre-test, post-test-1, post- Taken along with the accuracy data, we see that for these gradual improvers, GA does, indeed, increase while children are experiencing a change in task expertise compared with tasks that are entirely out of reach of their abilities or where they have achieved task competency. We argue that this reflects the cognitive effort of having mental strategies to deal with the problem in hand that are not yet easily applied.
Immediate improvers
Task performance. With children who showed immediate improvement on the task, the picture is very different. Their accuracy increased immediately from no to complete task competence (0% to 100% across only two sessions). In addition, their GA did not change across 
Discussion
These results suggest that especially high proportions of GA are associated with transient knowledge states. Clearly the children are averting their gaze for the majority of their thinking time (as we have shown in previous research). Whether teachers would be able to detect a 12% increase in GA in natural classroom interactions remains to be seen (such a change translates to a 420ms increase in a 3.5 second episode). What is important here is that the relative increase in GA indicates the cognitive difficulty of transitional knowledge states. During such times children are likely to benefit most from a "freedom" to avoid visual contact with another person.
General Discussion
It was hypothesized that when children experience a transient knowledge state (as defined by either an unstable level of performance plus a gradual increase in performance on task or an increased ability to explicitly reason about a task), their GA will be especially high. The data support this hypothesis. In Study 1 children whose quality of explanations improved (by showing an increased level of explicit understanding of the balance beam) used more GA than those whose explanations did not show a growing understanding. Interestingly, on this task both improvers and non-improvers balanced more beams correctly following modelling of the correct technique. The children who were beginning to understand and to explain the technique (improvers) used the greatest proportion of GA. We propose that this reflects the greater processing resources (perhaps in relation to working memory) involved on the task by children whose understanding is on the increase. In Study 2 around half of the children were immediate improvers on the time concept. The others exhibited a more gradual improvement with instruction, and it was these children who used the highest proportion of GA. In addition, these children increased their GA significantly during their transient or intermediate performance level, compared with when their performance was at floor or when it was at ceiling. Whether teachers would be able to detect this 12% increase in GA in natural classroom interactions remains to be seen (which translates to a 420ms increase in a 3.5 second episode in the currently used Time Task). The important point is that children whose partial task competence. In the beam task, children were able to copy an adult model and achieve greater task performance. It is only when their understanding of the task increases and they are truly engaged in solving the task themselves that the mental load increases and hence the GA. This finding relates to our earlier claims that a relatively high proportion of time spent in GA reflects task engagement (e.g. Phelps et al., 2006) .
High GA during transitional knowledge states may reflect heavy loading on working memory resources, particularly executive components. The face-to-face interference effects we have found (Doherty-Sneddon et al., 2000; Doherty-Sneddon et al., 2001) , the benefits of GA on task performance (Phelps et al., 2006) and recent pilot work showing exceptionally high amounts of GA even on easy tasks for children with ADHD , all support the view that GA serves to facilitate working memory function. An important area of research to advance is investigating the relationship between working memory function, patterns of GA, and transitional knowledge.
An important question is whether the current results will translate to knowledge acquisition within foundational domains. We have used mathematics questions in our gaze aversion paradigm in many studies and have established solidly that gaze aversion increases with cognitive difficulty of mathematics questions. In addition, we have found this pattern of GA in response to cognitive load in a number of different types of task, including biographical memory and verbal reasoning. In
Study 1 of the current paper we show that this pattern of increasing GA during difficult activity is also found in a very different task (balancing beams). Furthermore, time reading is part of the Scottish national curriculum and was suggested for the study by the participants' teachers. We are therefore confident that the pattern of results we have found in the time and balance beam tasks will translate to other domains, including those of foundational knowledge, and that children experiencing transitional knowledge within any domain will exhibit a peak in GA.
Even experienced teachers are little better than novices at detecting whether or not children have understood something on the basis of reading non-verbal cues (Jecker, Maccoby, & Breitrose, 1965 . Teachers' recognition of these strategies is crucial to effective scaffolding of learning (Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976) . If GA can be used reliably to judge children's readiness to learn, this will have significant implications for teacher training. We have recently shown that while teachers interpret GA correctly in some contexts (e.g., they associate it with answering hard questions compared with easy), they often misinterpret it, for example associating it with a child having given up thinking (Phelps et al., 2006) . Furthermore, and very importantly, teachers do not seem to use GA to judge wait time (the time between asking a question and waiting for the child's response),
and instead frequently interrupt the child's thinking, which is very detrimental to learning (DohertySneddon & Phelps, 2007) . The current work shows that high proportions of time spent on GA are Patterns of results indicate that GA promises to provide new and important insights into the cognitive as well as social functioning of these groups. For example, our pilot work with children with ADHD suggests that these children do not tolerate face gaze (i.e., they avert their gazes almost all the time), even during easy tasks. In the pilot study the children were engaged and performed well and in line with matched controls. What they could not do was maintain face contact while thinking. It may be that the particular deficits in working memory capacity associated with ADHD (Brocki, Randall, Bohln & Kerns, 2008) , can explain this "face-to-face shut-down." This is beyond the scope of the current paper but is a line of research our team is currently pursuing. Understanding the adaptive and constructive nature of GA is of utmost importance for teaching typical but especially atypically developing children, where a "look at me when I'm talking to you" approach may well be counter-productive.
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